Comparing foreign policy and development in Malta and Singapore after 1964 : between surviving, thriving and taking risks by Chong, Alan
                                                                    Small States & Territories, 3(2), 2020, pp. 433-454 
Comparing foreign policy and development in Malta and Singapore after 1964: Between 
surviving, thriving and taking risks  
Alan Chong 
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
Nanyang Technological University 
Singapore 
iscschong@ntu.edu.sg  
Abstract:  Malta and Singapore attained full independence nearly a year apart: 21 September 
1964 and 9 August 1965 respectively. Yet today, despite being self-classified as small states, 
Singapore has been treated as a developed economy by the OECD and is widely acknowledged 
to be a ‘behind the scenes’ helmsman of the regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. 
Malta, in contrast, appears to be a relative diplomatic bystander enunciating its own principles 
of sovereign difference, calling for EU and Mediterranean regional forums to address non-
traditional security issues, and focussing heavily on growing a service economy in finance, 
tourism, electronics and freight transhipment. Singapore’s growth trajectory takes on these 
areas as well, but also experiments with designs to establish itself as a transportation and 
communications hub for Asia. This preliminary comparison of Malta and Singapore as small 
states will proceed through three categories of examination: stabilising the geopolitical 
environment for growth; experiments in integration into a global economy; and the idea of a 
globally branded small state. 
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Introduction 
The comparison of pairs of small states as an academic venture is often fraught with 
methodological and political complications. When two small states are compared, questions 
are raised as to whether they could be justified on the basis of being located within a common 
geographical region. Yet this is not without controversy: does the location of two small states 
justify objectively fair comparisons? It is even trickier when two different small states are 
compared from two different regions. The geopolitical argument could also be applied to justify 
analysing two small states; but this can prove unsatisfactory due to the difficulties of treating 
differences of time and space with the same standard (Maass, 2017). Looking at development 
and economics across two small states evokes similar difficulties, often because each of them 
are products of specific regional histories and colonial construction that have evolved very 
differently with the onset of modernity.  
In this article, I will resort to a quasi-sociological argument to justify comparing Malta 
and Singapore as I have previously compared Singapore, Sri Lanka and the Vatican City 
(Chong, 2010; Chong, 2014b). A small state is often self-identified as such on a diplomatic 
level because its government or political elite asserts that it is a very special category of global 
security vulnerability. Following established scholarship, one can justify small states as sharing 
globally acknowledged, relatively weak capabilities in navigating the international order and 
suffering significant asymmetries in power vis-à-vis their larger neighbours and great powers 
(Fox, 1959; Vital, 1971; East, 1973; Keohane, 1969; Commonwealth Advisory Group, 1997; 
Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006; Thorhallsson, 2018; Baldacchino & Wivel, 2020). On a third 
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level, one can justify scrutinising any single small state, or a pair of them, to uncover the unique 
experiences that have shaped their present vulnerabilities or relative successes. In this article’s 
approach, every small state is both unique and universally comparable and hence when we use 
both approaches, we can indeed produce some interesting results as to how each small state’s 
exceptions have ushered in new operating norms for other small states.  
The thrust of sociology, like the thrust of studying a small state, is to investigate the 
causalities and cumulative mind sets of the evolution of particular human communities to 
produce deep knowledge. This sort of approach lends itself to the treatment of case studies, and 
at the same time, supplements the general approach of treating small states as a universal 
category of actorness within International Relations. Fundamentally, this leads one to query of 
any small state: how did it survive, and in some cases, thrive as a viable international actor 
backed by a functioning economy? Survival for a small state is often taken to be a negative 
framing of the objectives behind foreign, economic and defence policies. A small state’s self-
described policies for survival imply that it has reached its sovereign and resource limits and 
therefore can achieve no further goals in the international society. Thriving is much more 
positive and agentic: a small state thrives because it can somehow leverage its weaknesses and 
diminutive geography as resources for virtual enlargement of its goals and an ability to prove 
itself useful or even indispensable to the international community, with the attendant possibility 
of failing altogether. Malta and Singapore illuminate these possibilities. 
This article will proceed by first justifying the intellectual value of comparing Malta 
and Singapore. Thereafter, the two small states are compared according to three self-evident 
themes: stabilising the geopolitical environment for growth; experiments in integration into a 
global economy; and the idea of a globally branded small state. 
Malta and Singapore 
 Both Malta and Singapore were colonial creations. Britain founded both as strategic 
outposts of a trading empire and military defence. Although Malta has endured a long history 
of having been invaded and occupied by assorted European empires, it was the occupation of 
the island by the French forces under Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte that invited Britain’s 
attention through counterreaction, and partly by the invitation of the Maltese (Abela, 
1997/2017, pp. 167-179). By the 1930s, Malta was central as a naval and air base to British 
strategy to counter the Axis powers during the interwar years and especially during the Second 
World War. Malta served as the linchpin for the Allied campaign to retake North Africa and 
Italy during the latter part of the Second World War (Strawson, 1987, pp. 66-68). Britain’s 
naval base in Malta anchored the island’s economy right into the 1970s. Singapore was likewise 
built up as Britain’s equivalent of a naval base for projecting its politico-military presence 
throughout Southeast Asia. Right up to the outbreak of the Second World War, Singapore (like 
Malta) was touted as Britain’s unsinkable aircraft carrier. Axis airpower projected from Italy 
and Occupied Greece pounded Malta’s military infrastructure during the war in the 
Mediterranean, but the archipelago was not invaded. In contrast, the Japanese planned to 
neutralise British air and naval power by bombing Singapore’s harbours and airfields in 1941-
2, and eventually seizing and occupying Singapore after an effective siege. And while the 
British naval squadron acquitted itself gloriously in the Mediterranean by sallying forth from 
Alexandria and Gibraltar to escort convoys and challenge the Italian fleet and Luftwaffe in 
active battle formation, the battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse stationed in 
Singapore suffered an ignominious disaster at the hands of Japanese airpower projected from 
Indochina: the two attempted (without air cover) to thwart Japanese troopships out to land 
invasion forces on the nearby Malay Peninsula, and ended up being sunk (Murfett, et al., 1999, 
pp. 198-247). 
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These accounts of military history reveal one thing: both island territories retained 
strategic importance under modern conditions of air and naval connectivity, and this would 
advantage them after independence. Both postcolonial governments could simply avail 
themselves of path dependence by promoting themselves as either strategic allies of great 
powers or else converting their strategic transportation positions into commercial assets 
(Commonwealth Advisory Group, 1997; Thorhallsson, 2018). Ironically, both island states’ 
initial economic buoyancy was tied to the delayed withdrawal of the British military bases 
during the Cold War (Pirotta, 2018). In Singapore’s case, the economic footprint of the British 
bases contributed some 20 percent to the island’s GDP between 1968 and 1971 (Lee, 2000, p. 
69). 
 As entrepôts, both small island states sought to capitalise upon their respective imperial 
heritage as free ports and strategically positioned and sheltered harbours vis-à-vis their 
respective geographical sub-regions. Malta’s official statements of strategic interests since 
1964 have emphasised its maritime claims to stretch to 3,000 km2 of security concerns. This 
includes a huge ‘Search and Rescue’ area of responsibility, stretching from the coasts of 
Tunisia to Crete in Greece. This maritime enlargement also includes an Exclusive Economic 
Zone subsequently allowed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This 
is a maritime zone roughly ten times the land area of the Republic of Malta’s two main heavily 
populated islands of Malta and Gozo (Pace, 2013, p. 245). Malta Freeport also touts itself as 
the Mediterranean’s key transhipment hub in relation to the so-called Europe-Maghreb-Middle 
East commercial triangle. Even though the port operator was privatised and subsequently 
restructured as Malta Freeport Corporation, a separate Malta Freeport Terminals was created 
in 2001 as the operator of container terminals and warehousing provider. (Malta Freeport, 
2020) As part of a deliberate strategy of globalising Malta’s nautical prominence, Malta 
Freeport Terminals was contracted out to be managed by CMA-CGM, the world’s third largest 
shipping company, for a 30-year concession in 2004, later extended to 65 years (Malta 
Freeport, 2020). In 2011, CMA-CGM transferred half its shares to the Yildrom Group of 
Turkey; by 2013, it had sold 49% of its stake in Maltese subsidiary Terminal Link, to China 
Merchants Holdings (International) Ltd. (Malta Freeport, 2020)  
Likewise, the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) was privatised in stages, beginning in 
1994-7 with PSA Corporation succeeding to the port authority. By late 2003, PSA International 
was transformed into a holding company for subsidiaries conducting container operations 
worldwide, shipping related logistics and marine servicing. It even offers towage services in a 
number of countries. Its website claims that PSA’s portfolio currently comprises a network of 
over 50 deep sea, rail and inland terminals, as well as assorted marine and warehousing 
services, in 26 countries (PSA The World's Port of Call, 2020). Singapore has also manifested 
ambitions to serve as an air and logistics hub. Much like Malta, independent Singapore 
succeeded to the British imperial scheme of creating a naval, mercantile and aviation control 
hub over the commercial thoroughfares – both sea and air, as well as trade – of the Straits of 
Malacca, Straits of Singapore and into the lower third of the South China Sea. Before and after 
World War Two, Singapore served as Britain’s preeminent naval and air base ‘East of Suez’ 
until UK Governments decided on an economically induced strategic retrenchment after 1967. 
The same retrenchment by London’s defence planners rudely wrested Malta out of its 
millennial fortress economy role and obliged the search for an alternative business model.  
 In terms of demographics and territorial size, Malta and Singapore are both similar and 
different. Malta’s 441,970 inhabitants count as 95% native Maltese (World Population Review, 
2020). In contrast, Singapore boasts a population of 5.69 million, of which only 4 million (or 
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70%) are Singaporean citizens and permanent residents (SingStat, 2020). Amongst this 4 
million, 75% are self-identified to be of Chinese ethnicity, 13.5% claim Malay ethnicity, 9% 
claim Indian (or broadly South Asian) ethnicity, while the remaining roughly 3% are associated 
with mixed identities such as ‘Eurasians’, Arabs, and a handful of Europeans (SingStat - 
Population and Population Structure, 2010). As far as is known, Maltese citizens do not appear 
in official statistics, news or scholarly media to sub-differentiate themselves in terms of 
imported ethnicities. In the Singaporean case, it is commonly acknowledged that these sub-
identities are both historical legacies and endorsed by the People’s Action Party (PAP) state as 
constituent building blocks of a multiracial national identity (Clammer, 1998). In this case, 
these ‘hyphenated’ identities are vulnerable to the propaganda pulls from the ‘mother 
countries’ across the recognised sovereign borders of Singapore. This generates significant 
‘intermestic’ security complications for the island republic but can also serve as social 
facilitators for enhancing the island’s economic connectivity with China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Indonesia.  
Malta’s territorial size of 316 km2 is slightly under half of Singapore’s 726 km2 (World 
Population Review, 2020; SingStat - Land, 2020). On the surface, this is quite a marginal 
difference considering that these statistics compare badly with key economic hubs such as 
Amsterdam, Beijing, Shanghai, London, Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt, New York, Boston, Tokyo or 
Sydney. Surveying the small state literature, these geographical statistics are fairly typical and 
underscore the standard power indices that define small states as a distinct international 
category of actorness (Commonwealth Advisory Group, 1997). Unless such a minuscule 
territory contains exceptional natural resources onshore or offshore, such as oil, gas, metals, 
rare earths or fertilizer, such a miniscule territorial size is not expected to support a significant 
working population deriving their incomes from domestic resources, let alone render critical 
contributions to a global economy. The difference that Malta and Singapore offer to many 
small island states in the Caribbean Sea, Indian and Pacific Oceans is the exploitation of 
location and logistic advantage. Additionally, the economic and cultural trappings of having 
been part of a European empire – the British – has significantly enhanced the attraction of their 
territoriality and brand; this includes the currency of the English language across large swathes 
of the population. Singapore has, of course, transformed its small island territorial size to 
become a microcosm of the latest high technology and least labour-intensive industries of the 
developed world. There is extensive geo-economic mimicry of both the First World economies 
and the so-called ‘Tiger economies’ of East Asia in Singapore’s development policies; but it is 
a decidedly strategic one.  
Singaporean political and economic culture is mindful of the limitations of the size of 
its human resources and its potentially fractured national identity (Chew, 1991). Interestingly, 
Singapore seems to have made great strides over the past few years in attaining a rank of 9 out 
of 189 countries surveyed for achievement on the Human Capital Index (HCI). According to 
the World Bank, HCI “measures the amount of human capital that a child born today can expect 
to attain by age 18. It conveys the productivity of the next generation of workers compared to 
a benchmark of complete education and full health” (UNDP - Singapore, 2018) Malta comes 
in at position 29 out of 189 countries surveyed. (UNDP - Malta, 2018) One huge difference 
between the two lies in the percentage of “skilled labour” measured by the tertiary education 
qualifications of workers above the age of 15 against the entire registered workforce: Malta 
scored 60.6% while Singapore scored 81.7% (UNDP - Skilled Labour Force, 2018). Despite 
this gap, one might still surmise that both island states have attempted to prioritise the training 
of their only significant asset: the human resource.   
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Stabilizing the Geopolitical Environment for Growth 
 It is axiomatic that all small state policy practitioners and scholars pronounce that the 
operating environment for small states must either be tempered – even in some modest way – 
or accommodated through degrees of self-sacrifice (Keohane, 1969; Commonwealth Advisory 
Group, 1997; Chong, 2010; Fox, 1959). In the Maltese case, the Mediterranean Sea and its 
littoral states constitute the island’s immediate geopolitical environment (Pace, 2013). There 
are great and middle powers such as the UK, France and Italy possibly factored into the 
situation. And then there are, on the southern and eastern coasts, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, who are essentially overlapping members 
of what many argue to be a subset of a larger political region known as ‘Middle East and North 
Africa’ or MENA. During the Cold War, there was an added complication, with the USA and 
USSR treating littoral states as proxies for ideological and military competition (Nimetz, 1999).  
If one adopts a neo-realist analysis of all these states, Malta’s strategic position would 
be parlous considering that, for reasons of size and resources, it would more likely be a pawn 
instead of an active, let alone, autonomous player. In fact, Malta’s foreign policy and security 
position would easily suffer from the spill over of economic and humanitarian insecurities from 
the geographically contiguous states along the entire northern and southern Mediterranean 
especially since the vast majority could be classed as ‘Global South’ (Biscop, 2003, pp. 55-
62). As one of Malta’s own eminent foreign policy scholars has pointed out, the enlargement 
of the European Union by including its Mediterranean neighbours along the northern shores of 
the sea meant that its member states’ energy dependence on Algeria and the Arab Middle East 
depended upon the cooperative efforts of a ‘Mediterranean community’ (Pace, 2007, pp. 176-
177). Additionally, illegal immigration from North Africa across the Mediterranean into 
southern Europe is of enduring concern. Finally, the tentacles of Middle East related terrorism 
and other internecine intra-state and inter-state conflicts will affect the eastern Mediterranean 
EU littoral; and islands in the region act as potential transit points for both refugees and 
terrorists (Pace, 2007, pp. 177-179). Malta’s location defined its specific vulnerability to all 
these trends even to the present. 
Even so, Malta has historically encountered political discrimination from being located 
along Europe’s southern periphery for quite a while. At the inception of the European 
Community, one of continental Europe’s most ambitious regionalism experiments to date, the 
original member governments treated the Mediterranean littoral states outside its membership 
as ‘Mediterranean Non-Member States’ (MNMS). This category reflected a state of mind 
influenced chiefly by French plans to preserve exclusive economic and political relations with 
the freshly decolonised states in North Africa (Waites & Stavridis, 1999, p. 29). By the time 
Britain joined the EC in 1973 the MNMS category was enlarged to take into account Britain’s 
influence with Cyprus, Egypt and Jordan. At the same time, there were arguments from inside 
the EC and amongst Britain’s former colonies that the former imperial metropoles ought to 
balance or prioritise economic market openings between the EC’s near abroad (i.e. the MNMS) 
and the so-called African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states (Waites & Stavridis, 1999, pp. 
29-30). 
Increasingly such debates led to defensive economic nationalism within the EC 
members as to whether they should even open the EC’s markets to the detriment of their own 
producers in competing agricultural categories. One could classify this as an economic and 
food security issue. The EC’s, and subsequently the EU’s, dealings with the MNMS became 
ensnared in differences with certain MNMS over the interests of oil producers like Algeria and 
Libya, and oil consumers like the EC/EU members along with Morocco (Waites & Stavridis, 
1999, p. 31). 
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Thirdly, the Cold War divided both the MNMS states amongst themselves, as well as 
the MNMS against the EC/EU. Every one of these states’ foreign policy orientations were 
judged according to whether they hewed towards a pro-NATO and pro-Washington line, or a 
pro-Soviet and Warsaw Pact line. Fourthly, the spill over ideological effects from the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 polarised the way EC/EU member governments and their respective public 
opinion viewed closer association with the MNMS (Waites & Stavridis, 1999, p. 31). Even 
within the EC/EU, the dominant discourse vis-à-vis its members exhibited some discriminatory 
tones towards the smaller and less developed among them. One foreign policy official had been 
quoted as early as 1983 as stating that it was a fact that ‘second ranked’ and ‘smaller countries’ 
ought to pay a price for political cooperation with and within the EC/EU through the ‘bending 
of national principles’ (Wallace, 1983, p. 13). 
Not surprisingly, Malta’s erstwhile foreign minister George Vella reflected in 1999, 
nearly a decade after the Cold War ended, that the republic’s policy of neutrality and 
nonalignment, enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, would remain in place (Vella, 1999). Noting 
that security crises had ‘paradoxically escalated’ since the collapse of the USSR, Vella 
emphasised that the appropriate foreign policy for his country ought to uphold values of 
democratic tolerance towards diverse religious beliefs and cultures, while opposing all forms 
of extremism including nationalism (Vella, 1999, p. 146). He observed that the majority of 
Malta’s Mediterranean neighbours suffered greatly from non-conventional security threats. 
Vella had in mind then Gaddafi-ruled Libya’s economic distress under UN sanctions, Algeria’s 
drift towards religious fundamentalism and continuing socio-political divisions on Cyprus 
gravitating towards the traditional Greek-Turkish rivalry. Furthermore, he also extrapolated 
that the Middle East peace process had to maintain some momentum; otherwise, its spill over 
effects would jeopardise Mediterranean security and Malta’s security along with it (Vella, 
1999, pp. 148-149). With much prescience, he was also thinking of the refugees that would 
flock by boat to ‘safe havens’ all along the Sea, straining host governments’ welfare and 
financial capabilities. Additionally, throughout much of Muammar Gaddafi’s reign in Libya, 
Valletta maintained an actively nonaligned position that favoured Libyan interests and 
resistance against American charges that the Gaddafi regime was supporting transnational 
terrorism and upsetting transatlantic security. Valletta treated Libya instead as a close 
neighbour who served as both a good customer for exports from Malta while also maintaining 
a climate of law and order in North Africa that kept refugees from crossing the Mediterranean 
(Pace, 1999, pp. 228-229). Much of this scenario remains current, given the ongoing illegal 
migration from Syria’s unfinished civil war since 2011 and the refugees from MENA fleeing 
both political oppression and genocide, and now, climate change. 
From a mainstream small state perspective, there is nothing much one can argue about 
a pro-multilateralist, non-aligned and non-military orientation of foreign policy (East, 1973). 
Indeed, one should also note Malta’s call in tandem for the institutionalizing of Mediterranean 
security agendas in the deliberations of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). Malta has been vocal in calling for the literal enlargement of the OSCE agenda 
to include all Mediterranean states, risking antagonism from the more EU focussed members. 
Vella acknowledged cryptically what he termed “perceived difficulties” within the OSCE, and 
proposed that perhaps the littoral states could convene a Conference on Security Cooperation 
in the Mediterranean (CSCM) as an autonomous offshoot of the OSCE whilst retaining some 
form of political link with the latter (Vella, 1999, p. 150). This idea had successfully taken off 
as the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. This 
Inter-Parliamentary CSCM had staged its fourth round in Greece (2005) and an earlier round 
was significantly held in Valletta itself in 1995. It pledges its participants to foster dialogue on 
common security problems on the basis of equal partnership and confidence building. It is on 
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this basis that Malta’s foreign policy can be interpreted as having pragmatically inched away 
from rigid neutrality – at least in practice – by touting its role as a ‘trusted interlocutor’ between 
the EU and the Arab Mediterranean (Pace, 2013, pp. 243-245). 
However, at that 2005 Inter-Parliamentary CSCM meeting, the members agreed to 
encompass a wider Mediterranean membership under a reconstituted institution named the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), whose secretariat is housed in Naples, 
Italy. On its website, PAM appears to be fully-fledged, including more than a dozen ad hoc 
committees studying issues of non-traditional security along with the informal diplomatic 
networking through the mechanism of ‘national focal points’ for each of the 26 member 
parliaments, 2 associate partners and 12 observer missions (PAM, 2020). It also appears that 
the PAM is also acting as a lobby for its member governments vis-à-vis UNCTAD and OECD 
and their negotiating processes. Moreover, PAM currently serves as an information and ‘best 
practices’ dissemination forum for anti-COVID-19 national efforts across the Euro-
Mediterranean region (PAM, 2020). The results of the PAM and its predecessor, the Inter-
Parliamentary CSCM, are not fully in view but from the perspective of small states in IR, the 
journey in starting dialogue instead of militarised and antagonistic posturing is itself worthy of 
celebration as a gain for Maltese foreign policy. As has been argued, if multilateralist processes 
constrain Gulliver, this is an achievement of the small state’s basic survival goal (Keohane, 
1969). 
In an even more significant demonstration of small state effectiveness in leading 
international organisations by discharging its due responsibilities as an appointment holder, 
Malta celebrated its role as the President of the EU Council in 2017 as an outsized diplomatic 
‘shepherd’ (Wivel, 2018). Even though national delegations’ attendance of EU Council 
meetings has been tepid and inconsistent, Malta used its presidency to highlight the gravity of 
Mediterranean security issues in Brussels by linking migration, development and security 
(Pace, 2018, pp. 75-81). These moves capitalised on the diplomatic momentum of the EU-
Africa Summit convened also in Malta in 2015. Additionally, Malta invoked the EU’s 
environment-friendly credentials to initiate discussions on a Blue Growth Strategy for the 
Mediterranean that included talks on overfishing, sustainable fishing and job creation relating 
to sustainable development goals around the maritime sub-region (Pace, 2018, p. 84). It helped 
that the veteran foreign minister (and now Head of State) George Vella was energetic in leading 
Malta’s stint as EU Council President during those six months in 2017. While no concrete 
agreement was reached during the presidency, Valletta’s efforts have generated discussion 
space that will probably gain traction on the strong diplomatic tailwind of the ongoing COVID-
19 non-traditional security threat. 
 Singapore faced a similarly perilous security situation at the point of independence in 
August 1965 at the height of the Cold War in Asia. US-USSR competition was in full force, 
and the divisions represented by the African-Asian solidarity movements forced the new 
republic to either take sides or practise a brand of nonalignment acceptable to its immediate 
neighbours (Chan, 1988; Leifer, 1989). The ruling Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) fought and 
won colonially administered elections on the basis of heralding a new democratic socialist 
order that was more in tune with the worldwide aspirations of anticolonial populations. This 
was initially accommodative of the leftist orientation of President Sukarno of Indonesia and 
his omnidirectional anti-neocolonialist crusade at home and abroad. But the PAP under Lee 
Kuan Yew also wished to retain the colonial-era British defence arrangements that yoked anti-
communist, pro-western Malaya’s national and external security to the western camp in world 
politics. Lee Kuan Yew had fought very hard at home to outmanoeuvre his far Left opponents 
within the PAP and harboured no wish to see the communist insurgents in Malaya and other 
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leftist countries in Asia succeed by invading Singapore in the name of revolution. Additionally, 
the birth of an independent Singapore took place against the backdrop of the collapsing truce 
between North and South Vietnam following the French Indochina War of 1946-54. The US 
had launched a massive military and economic effort to bolster South Vietnam’s non-
communist governments in spite of a few coups in Saigon. But this was petering out within a 
decade following the severe knocks on US domestic morale in the wake of the Tet Offensive, 
the My Lai massacre and the horrific pictures of casualties televised to Americans at home by 
their own media companies. A newly emboldened Maoist China was bent on ‘exporting 
revolution’ following the boost in confidence given by its participation in the Korean War and 
now its full throated support for North Vietnam’s struggle to reunify with the South through 
force. During the 1971 Commonwealth Summit held in Singapore, Soviet warships sailed 
within visual proximity to Singapore’s southern port facilities as if to signal that communist 
forces could menace both Singaporean independence and those of the non-communist 
Commonwealth members. 
 As expected, Singapore officially enunciated a nonaligned foreign policy with a twist. 
As its first foreign minister S. Rajaratnam put it, Singapore practised a foreign policy 
distinguishing words from deeds (Chong, 2006; Chong & Ong-Webb, 2018). Firstly, the ideal 
foreign policy would be one where words coincided with deeds. Included in this category are 
Singapore’s close friends and allies because of a coincidence of fundamental objectives and 
national interests, in spite of minor bilateral ‘irritations’ from time to time.  
 The second category would be those whose deeds reflect normalisation and amity 
towards Singapore, while their official rhetoric reflects a dogmatic ideological hostility. 
‘[T]here is always the hope that friendly relations, however tentative and however cautious, 
could in the course of time and with good sense on both sides, mature into friendship of the 
first category’ (Chong & Ong-Webb, 2018).  
 The third category is the negative extreme where both words and deeds are consistently 
hostile to Singaporean national interests and hence becoming a case of irreconcilable enemies. 
Rajaratnam observed in 1965 that no country had thus far entered this category. Five decades 
– and a Cold War – later, Singapore rarely had to deal with the nightmarish third category.  
 From time to time, Singapore’s foreign policy partners have oscillated between 
categories one and two. Rajaratnam had always counselled patience, and adherence to the 
principle of welcoming friendship from all directions. This represented a chameleonic form of 
nonalignment even if the latter has been described as ‘slippery’ to begin with (Chong, 2006). 
Well into the Cold War, between 1975 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Singapore was 
quietly servicing the US military effort in Vietnam by supplying the US military and South 
Vietnam with consumer goods, facilitating rubber supplies, and providing hospitality for US 
servicemen’s ‘Rest and Recreation’ needs. At the same time, the island republic allowed 
Communist Beijing’s Bank of China to retain a branch in Singapore and allowed China-made 
consumer goods to be sold in Singapore shops. Beijing’s erstwhile rival across the Taiwan 
Straits sustained a cosy relationship with Lee Kuan Yew himself along with key members of 
Singapore’s Cabinet. Most importantly, Taipei happily allowed the Singapore Armed Forces 
to train in Taiwan given Singapore’s shortage of training areas. This unusual arrangement was 
to prove both a liability and a bargaining chip in Singapore-Beijing relations following Mao’s 
passing in 1976. Long before this delicate diplomatic dance across the Taiwan Straits, 
Singapore was carrying on an undeclared illicit trade with Sukarno’s Indonesia, despite the 
latter’s loud propaganda against Singapore’s coddling of British neo-colonialist air and naval 
bases on its territory. 
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Even in the 1990s and 2000s, Singapore’s chameleonic nonalignment was manifested 
in relations with North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar and most recently with Zimbabwe and 
Russia. During the unprecedented Trump-Kim Summit, held on Sentosa Island, in Singapore, 
in 2018, it came to light that both North Korea and the US found Singapore an acceptable 
intermediary given both sides’ quiet Cold War connections with Singapore in trade and other 
political fields. North Korea had benefitted apparently from Singapore by treating their 
embassy as a shopping agent for consumer goods and – some suspect – military-capable 
industrial hardware, given Singapore’s open port status. It is also widely known that North 
Korea has sent a steady trickle of students to study at Singapore’s tertiary institutions. 
Singapore-Iranian and Singapore-Myanmar relations have taken after a similar pattern where 
the island republic offered both ‘pariah’ governments an open door for sending their elites to 
the island for ‘medical tourism’ under the care of health facilities that are regarded as second 
to none. Interestingly, Iran has taken a leaf from the Singapore foreign policy playbook and 
launched a campaign to draw medical tourists to the country for cost-effective high quality 
English-speaking medical treatment (Iraniansurgery.com, 2019). More recently, in the 2000s, 
Singapore served as Zimbabwean strongman Robert Mugabe’s only reliable Commonwealth 
friend and sanctions-free tourist destination (Miller, 2017). Unsurprisingly, Mugabe passed 
away in a Singapore hospital while under treatment for an undisclosed illness in September 
2019. During the final years of Lee Kuan Yew’s life, Singapore’s search for new markets and 
investment destinations led the veritable ‘Minister Mentor’ to visit Putin’s Russia to court 
Russian investments and acknowledge Russian elites’ fascination with Singapore’s economic 
and one party dominant democratic models. Even Singapore’s current engagement with 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is being undertaken at a time when much of the EU’s larger 
member economies and the Trump Presidency are wary of China’s attempt at trans-regional 
economic and technological hegemony. 
In comparing attempts by Malta and Singapore to influence their foreign policy 
environment for their developmental needs, there are obvious parallels in the pursuit of 
nonalignment for strategic reasons. Complete bandwagoning with a great power is clearly 
disavowed for its risk of generating an unhealthy dependency amounting to some form of 
disguised colonialism. Coalescing and seeking undeclared alliances with equally weak and 
vulnerable states seems like the more viable option (Jayakumar, 2011; Kausikan, 2017; Yong, 
2019). Maltese foreign policy indulged Gaddafi-ruled Libya’s maverick anti-western postures 
and offered itself as interlocutor between the EU and any number of nettlesome Arab 
Mediterranean neighbours, while Singapore courted Taiwan, Indonesia, North Korea, Iran, 
Myanmar and Zimbabwe along with the rest of Asia when it was politically risky to do so 
during the Cold War and after. But Singapore also actively sought to balance the influence of 
the great powers like China, Russia and the US through subtle manoeuvres in foreign policy 
even though it could not do so militarily. Malta tried too by emphasising neutrality between 
Washington and Moscow, but Valletta chose a less risky play without ramping up economic 
relations in a significant way with the great powers. But like Singapore encouraging 
developmental regionalism in the form of founding the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and its associated security forums in the 1990s and 2000s, Malta chose to align its 
economic needs with the EC/EU despite the perceived risks of discrimination by the bigger 
members. It also attempted to cultivate trade ties under the umbrella of fostering the CSCM 
vision (Leifer, 1989; Ganesan, 1998; Pace, 1999; Vella, 1999; Pace, 2018 ). 
Experiments in Integration into a Global Economy 
 Both Malta and Singapore thrive on regional and international trade. Small states tend 
to operate on the logic that, if the world possesses stakes in these small economies, over time, 
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their presence will entrench some degree of indispensability to the small state’s economy. 
According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity website, Malta appears to have 
achieved significant economic status despite its territorial size. The OEC’s narrative of the 
island state’s economic position in relation to its 20181 statistics reads as follows: 
In 2018 Malta exported a total of $4.74B, making it the number 114 exporter in the 
world. During the last five reported years, the exports of Malta have changed by 
$2.55B: from $7.29B in 2013 to $4.74B in 2018. 
The most recent exports are led by: refined petroleum ($943M), integrated circuits 
($651M), packaged medicaments ($463M), models and stuffed animals ($195M), 
and low-voltage protection equipment ($157M). The most common destination for 
Malta’s exports are: Germany ($511M), France ($419M), Italy ($361M), Singapore 
($282M) and Libya ($252M). 
 
In 2018, Malta imported $14.8B, making it the number 85 trade destination in the 
world. During the last five reported years, Malta’s imports changed by $3.13B: from 
$11.7B in 2013 to $14.8B in 2018 (OEC on Malta, 2018). 
 
 The picture portrayed here is one of a successful export and import dependent economy. 
Understandably, imports outstrip exports by a three to one ratio, given the fact that the island 
possesses no natural resources and imports even most of its basic needs. It is also quite evident 
that the island’s exports reflect the needs of servicing a global technological economy: 
integrated circuits, fuel products, medical and artisanal novelties. Notably, it imports maritime 
transportation craft presumably to enhance the transportation of goods and tourists. The top 
trading partners of the island appear oriented towards mostly developed economies, with a few 
exceptions such as Russia, China and the Philippines. From the perspective of straightforward 
economic security, the size of Malta’s external trade in dollar terms appears relatively evenly 
spread out in the event of any bilaterally imposed embargo involving its major trading partners. 
 And yet, as is typical of fast-growing developing economies, these niche areas are not 
unique growth formulae. Every growing economy aims for the fastest solutions for national 
unemployment without necessarily thinking of their sustainability in relation to the long term. 
Nonetheless, the World Bank has assigned Malta a human capital index of 0.70, placing it in 
the top band alongside the majority of the EU countries, Canada, USA, Australia and New 
Zealand. The World Bank’s Human Capital index assesses the impact of health and education 
strategies on the productivity of the next generation of workers (World Bank, 2019). The 
UNDP ranks Malta even higher at 0.878, ranking 29 out of 189 countries surveyed (UNDP - 
Malta, 2018). This also partly explains why Malta boasts a GDP per capita of US$31,867, 
ranking number 34 worldwide.  
If one looks at the contribution of different sectors to GDP, tourism stands out with a 
figure of around 13.4%, followed by the general services sector (comprising professional and 
technical services combined with financial and insurance activities) at 11.6%, with the other 
industrial sectors making up single digit percentages (NSO Malta, 2020). Tourism is 
sustainable, provided Malta’s urban housing and transport infrastructures can continue 
expanding to support increased numbers of visitors. Otherwise, the bottlenecks to the future 
growth of tourism will intensify to the point of throttling GDP growth. The financial sector is 
nonetheless a bright spot that perhaps does not need extensive infrastructure development, 
                                                          
1 2018 is used as the benchmark year for comparing Malta and Singapore: it is the latest year for which fully 
declared economic statistics were available for both island states at the time of writing. 
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aside from adopting the latest in information and communications technology to facilitate real 
time economic data processing. The ‘invest in Malta’ campaigns appear to be working, and the 
attractiveness of Malta’s initial implementation of an offshore banking haven has been finessed 
into a full-scale onshore Malta Financial Services Centre. This approach allows the application 
of varied regulations being applied to full-fledged banks, as well as ‘offshore operations’ (Fabri 
& Baldacchino, 1999). This would of course sit well with the regulatory obsessions of the US 
Treasury Department or the European Central Bank. Malta appears to have kept its financial 
reputation secure all these years. This is most strongly attested to by the fact that HSBC Bank 
has retained its status as Malta’s biggest and oldest bank to the point of creating HSBC Bank 
Malta as a brand name subsidiary of its UK parent. Nonetheless, a 2016 report commissioned 
by the Central Bank of Malta warned that:  
the transformation of the Maltese economy is the result of the appearance of a large swath 
of new service operators rather than the disappearance of existing industrial operators. 
Some industrial sub-sectors, such as the manufacturing of pharmaceutical products have 
increased their economic share. Meanwhile, even agriculture and fisheries witnessed 
considerable growth in value added, up by 45%, despite having their share in the national 
economy halve in the last two decades (Grech, et al., 2016, p. 17). 
 This is an ostensible warning that Malta is not fully investing in a high technology 
economy within a specific future-oriented policy roadmap. Indeed, labour productivity per 
worker has declined in real terms. Amidst the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the private sector 
has partnered the Ministry for Economy, Investment and Small Businesses, and the Malta 
Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and Industry to offer webinars for firms interested in further 
internationalisation of their operations and marketing. This appears to be a run of the mill 
prescription for post pandemic recovery (Times of Malta, 2020). 
 According to the same Observatory of Economic Complexity think-tank website, 
Singapore’s economic integration with the world economy is comparatively more glowing: 
In 2018, Singapore imported $323B, making it the number 16 trade destination in the 
world. During the last five reported years, Singapore’s imports changed by -$44.4B: 
from $368B in 2013 to $323B in 2018. 
The most recent imports of Singapore are led by refined petroleum ($48B), integrated 
circuits ($46.3B), crude petroleum ($25.8B), gold ($10.1B) and office machine parts 
($7.11B). The most significant import partners for Singapore are: China ($47.2B), 
Malaysia ($36.8B), United States ($28.9B), Chinese Taipei ($22B) and Japan 
($17.8B). 
In 2018, Singapore exported $165B worth of services. The top services exported by 
Singapore in 2018 were: miscellaneous business, professional, and technical services 
($46.4B), sea transport ($41.4B), financial services ($20.7B), travel ($20.4B) and air 
transport ($9.53B) (OEC on Singapore, 2018).  
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 From this description, there are tremendous overlaps with Malta’s profile. Singapore is 
evidently trading in all the components of high technology industry, oil and oil derivatives, as 
well as business, professional and logistics services. Its largest markets are however located in 
Asia and the Pacific Rim. The volume of turnover is several hundred percent larger than 
Malta’s, implying either that Singapore’s business promotion strategies are more sophisticated 
in delivering outcomes or have dabbled successfully in high risk ventures. The problem of risk 
in attracting high volume oil and manufacturing industries lies in the amplified impact factor 
when the developed country markets suffer from an economic downturn (Yong, 2019). 
 Apart from these similarities and differences with Malta, Singapore’s economy carries 
with it several insights about integrating into the world economy. In this regard, this author 
will draw upon several semi-biographical and philosophical texts authored by key personalities 
involved in Singapore’s economic transformation. Incidentally, this is an aspect in which this 
author has momentarily been unable to find a parallel in studies of Malta.  
Firstly, integration into the world economy came about for Singapore through trial and 
error, inspired by a few regional examples. Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs record the fact that 
Singapore’s post-Independence economy in the 1960s needed to experiment with low 
technology manufactures that could deliver profits and employment in the shortest time 
possible with the minimum of capital outlay. Hence, Singapore’s industrial export forays in the 
early to mid-1960s included producing matchsticks, mosquito coil, vegetable oils, hair cream, 
joss paper and mothballs. The PAP government even tried luring Hong Kong and Taiwan 
investors into Singapore to duplicate their factories there, producing toys, textiles and garments 
(Lee, 2000, p. 68). As Lee recounted it, the initial large expenditures lavished on renovating 
jungle land in the western part of the island for a dedicated ‘industrial park’ failed to attract the 
interest of foreign investors, except for paper recycling and ceramics businesses, both of which 
petered out quickly. Making fishhooks for foreign companies fared slightly better but this was 
not a sure formula for future success (Lee, 2000, p. 69). It finally came down to the efforts of 
Singapore’s investment promotion agencies that turned the image of Singapore’s hospitality to 
foreign enterprise around: the work of the Economic Development Board, Enterprise Singapore 
and the indefatigable personal networking of the PAP Cabinet ministers. 
 Secondly, the PAP leaders, especially Lee Kuan Yew himself, heeded the advice from 
a number of sources about calming the anxieties of western and Asian capitalist investors in 
relation to the PAP’s ideology of democratic socialism and the attendant risks of investing in 
what was then a Third World Singapore. Dr Albert Winsemius, formerly of the UNDP, first 
made his acquaintance with the PAP in 1960 on a fact-finding visit. Consequently, he 
befriended Lee and advised him that Singapore’s situation required a psychological gambit on 
top of economic rationality. He advised the PAP to make a symbolic peace with the island’s 
colonial legacy to reassure investors that the new nationalist government was not out to 
expropriate foreign holdings in Singapore. He advised Lee to retain the statue of Thomas 
Stamford Raffles, the founder of colonial Singapore, at the mouth of the Singapore River (Lee, 
2000, p. 67). This has served as a signal that Singapore would embrace and not renege on its 
imported western heritage. Subsequently, Lee spent a short sabbatical at Harvard University in 
1968 where he met and discussed Singapore’s economic strategies with a number of academics. 
He admitted that Raymond Vernon, the scholar closely associated with theorising the prospects 
of multinational corporations, made a positive impression on him and convinced him to defy 
the then Third World ‘orthodoxy’ of rejecting dependent relationships with western companies. 
Lee claimed that Vernon imparted to him the idea that technology, industry and markets were 
all changing with the times and in productive flux (Lee, 2000, pp. 73-74). 
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This was buttressed by Lee’s very capable Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee’s personal 
reflections about experimenting with unorthodox economics. Goh in particular enunciated in 
his many speeches in the late 1960s and 1970s the need to ensure that Singaporeans needed to 
avail themselves of the know-how, technical competence, and work attitudes of foreign 
companies invested in Singapore and employing them to good local effect (Goh, 1995). Once 
this ‘intellectual capital’ was acquired, Singaporeans could pioneer their own companies and 
try their hand at start-ups. In this way, Singaporean economics could invert the Marxist-
Leninist warning about the one-way exploitation by foreign ‘imperialist’ capital.  
The rest of the Singapore story then falls into place. Attracting USA’s Hewlett Packard 
(HP) to set up factories producing printers and ink cartridges in Singapore ushered in the 
company’s long-term stakes on the island. This has now morphed into HP reinventing its 
Singapore base for R&D activities while moving its factory operations offshore to the rest of 
Asia. The other big anchor of confidence in Singapore’s integration into the global petroleum 
economy lies with the successful attraction of Japan’s petrochemical giant Sumitomo 
Corporation to set up Singapore’s first full scale refinery on Jurong Island, offshore from the 
main island of Singapore. The Japanese were persuaded that, instead of shipping the oil bought 
from the Middle East to Japan for refining at exorbitant cost, they could do so at midpoint, i.e. 
Singapore, given its strategic location between two Oceans. This initiated a virtuous cycle with 
other petroleum companies adapting to a demonstration model and then falling into path 
dependence via Sumitomo’s example. 
 Both Malta and Singapore appear to be heading in the same direction of retaining their 
strategic plugs into the global economy. But the relative success of Singapore beckons a host 
of questions this short article can only tentatively surmise: why was Singapore willing to take 
such risky gambles and play up the human promotional aspects of economic attraction? 
The Idea of a Globally Branded Small State 
 In Lee Kuan Yew’s telling of the ‘Singapore Story’, the formula behind the 
developmental orientation of Singapore’s foreign economic policy is summed up in one word: 
‘confidence’ (Lee, 2000, p. 87). From the first impressions of investors arriving at the airport, 
taking in tree lined roads and orderly traffic to the trouble-free operation of the lifts they have 
to ride to view the industrial factory floors, every aspect relevant to the projection of an efficient 
coordinated society had to count towards soft power (Lee, 2000, pp. 80-87). 
In the author’s own research on small state soft power, the ability to offer something of 
value to outsiders is a necessity for sustaining the sovereign state. The orthodox logics of 
interdependence and comparative economic advantage offer one set of pedestrian answers 
concerning the need for all states to contribute to the value chain across the globe. But in 
offering value to the world of states, non-state actors and peoples can be much more than 
merely pandering to material needs. Soft power can be a mode of ensuring the survival of a 
repository of attractiveness through services in diplomacy and serving as demonstrations of 
good governance (Chong, 2010). Strategies of ‘virtual enlargement’ are actually feasible for 
the vast majority of states in the international community. The larger powers – the US, Russia, 
China, France, Germany, India and Japan and the UK – have already understood this far earlier 
and on a larger scale than most others. They became ‘great’ in part due to the practices of 
physical enlargement in the form of physical conquest and intensive physical penetration across 
borders in non-traditional spheres of influence, which they actively supplemented with virtual 
enlargement through the export of ideologies, educational standards, popular culture and 
lifestyle patterns (Chong, 2007; 2014a). 
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The point of virtual enlargement through ideational instruments is to ensure that the 
example, or services, offered by the soft power exerciser is prolonged to benefit the exerciser’s 
vitality as a recognised member of international society indefinitely. In relation to small states, 
smallness, being geographically limited, can be psychologically tactical in disarming major 
powers’ suspicions towards the small state’s motives. On the other hand, as some have argued, 
the small state’s foreign policy apparatus may possess among its human resources, intellectual 
and propagandistic skills that are disproportionate to its physical size (Fox, 1959; 
Commonwealth Advisory Group, 1997). One can therefore link the possibility of soft power 
usage by small states with the prospects for the virtual enlargement of their presence in the 
international community through medium theory borrowed from media studies (Chong, 2010). 
 In the Singapore case, its active branding as an attractive investment destination is 
treated seriously as an existential exercise, managed informally by individuals in government 
and by several full-time economic promotion agencies. The Economic Development Board 
(EDB) is the most prominently studied amongst these agencies. In Edgar Schein’s book, he 
argued that the EDB was successful because it possessed an organisational culture of “strategic 
pragmatism” (Schein, 1996). A business school professor, Schein was impressed by the energy, 
positive attitudes and overall ‘can-do’ outlook of the staff across the hierarchy. More 
importantly, national promotion was a matter of learning and well-rehearsed practices of 
vigilance and open intelligence gathering: 
The basic work of the EDB is carried out through its first-line senior officers who are 
assigned a technical area to develop by becoming familiar with the area, the major 
companies worldwide operating in that area, and the prospects for recruiting those 
companies to develop a project in Singapore. As projects are developed, the proposing 
officers recruit from among their peers the necessary additional people they will need. 
Teams are thus formed, and officers often end up “matrixed” across several divisions, 
reporting to several bosses simultaneously. This way of working internally mirrors 
Singapore’s overall manner of operation, in that most senior civil servants or private 
sector executives have as many as five different jobs in different organisations at the 
same time. Such “multitasking” reflects a scarcity of sufficiently trained people in 
Singapore, but it has the benefit of creating networks and building trust across a wide 
range of government units and private companies (Schein, 1996, p. 11). 
Human resources are not treated as factory shop floor employees. They work across a 
somewhat flatter and fluid collaborative environment to strategically woo ‘sunrise’ industries 
and firms to Singapore. Initially, Lee Kuan Yew felt that the EDB merely introduced 
companies who adored the risk appetite the agency shared and the promise of Singapore as a 
tabula rasa for their business (Lee, 2000, pp. 77-80). Since the mid-1980s, up till the present, 
the EDB has acted more strategically by actively issuing Pioneer Certificates and Development 
and Experience Incentives for companies that invest in Singapore. The EDB currently 
encourages companies that employ ‘intellectual property’ derived from R&D use to set up shop 
in Singapore; specialise in financial strategies and treasury management; promote energy 
efficient industry; aircraft leasing; and activities that achieve “an intensification of industrial 
land use towards more land-efficient and higher value-added activities” (EDB Singapore, 
2019). In this way, the branding of Singapore goes beyond merely sloganeering; it is also 
employing advertising qua ‘incentive policy’ to target industries that optimise the use of land, 
labour, capital and technology. The latter are clearly the usual resource shortfalls found in a 
small state. Currently, the Singaporean Ministry of Trade and Industry has openly sounded the 
warning for firms to seize the COVID-19 induced hiatus in economic growth as an opportunity 
to go digital in their business process operations and marketing in view of the official prognosis 
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that the pandemic will ultimately produce a significant transformation of the global economy. 
The Minister warned that Singapore needed to consistently defy the “tyranny of geography” in 
order to keep its prosperity (Lai, 2020). 
 Malta Enterprise is the EDB’s counterpart in Malta. Its objective is a mirror of the small 
state’s need to build a manufacturing base that is sustainable and retains long term viability. It 
is stated on its website that: 
 
Malta Enterprise provides incentives for enterprises demonstrating commitment 
towards growth, an increase in value added and employment. Enterprises engaged in 
manufacturing, ICT development activities, call centres, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology, aviation and maritime services, education and training, logistics and 
more may benefit from these incentives (Malta Enterprise, 2020). 
  
Very much like Singapore, this declaration of intent reveals successive Maltese governments’ 
aspirations to build niche strengths in the soft industries that prioritise human resources, talent 
and R&D – and broadly knowledge creation – over those that demand land and large volumes 
of physical raw materials. Most importantly, these industries of the present and future do not 
tax, in theory at least, Malta’s miniscule territorial size. Playmobil Malta’s CEO, Mathias 
Fauser has praised the skill quality of Maltese workers and the responsiveness of its 
government; while David Schembri, Director of Manufacturing, Cardinal Health, commends 
Malta for its logistical efficiency and connectivity to EU markets, Latin America and Asia 
through air and shipping connectivity. Schembri tellingly quotes cost efficiency as the third 
most significant factor for his company’s stake in Malta. In fourth place, he cites its political 
and social stability. Luke Satariano, CEO of machine tool manufacturer MCL, in turn praises 
Malta’s vocational schools for allowing him to produce accessories and machinery for other 
firms (Malta Enterprise - Testimonials, 2020). Yet, notwithstanding these branding efforts, the 
Maltese government still does not appear to have drawn up a future oriented strategy for the 
positioning of its workforce and its hospitality to foreign investments for a high technology 
vision, as has been flagged by a 2016 Central Bank of Malta report (Grech, et al., 2016). This 
is not a flaw per se, but it does suggest a level of passivity in governmental planning for 
coordinating public and private sector collaborations and strategic industrial foresight. 
COVID-19 could in fact be a reason to compel businesses to embrace the so-called Fourth 
Industrial Revolution in digitalizing business.  
In comparative terms, it might be said that the global branding of both Singapore and 
Malta operate along the same frequency but with different degrees of intensity. It is also 
strongly evident that both small states ardently embrace soft power in foreign economic policy 
within the discourse of attracting businesses and investment in future forward industries as well 
as currently profitable ones. Through investment promotion efforts, both small states enlarge 
themselves virtually through their brands that are simultaneously riding on globalisation-
assisted interdependence. The difference between the two small island states lies in the degree 
of risk, aggressiveness, and gamble in their respective promotion efforts. 
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Malta and Singapore: The difference in degrees of risk? 
 In this tentative comparison of Malta and Singapore, this article has attempted to cut to 
the core of the study of small states in international politics by studying foreign policy and 
development. How do these two instruments and fields of policy endeavour enable both states 
to survive, and even thrive, in international society? Foreign policy adjusts relationships 
between the small state and the rest of the international society by either practising power 
politics at one extreme, to various stages of middling strategies that lead to the other extreme 
of almost complete pacifism. Hence, foreign policy matters to the study of small states because 
it determines physical security, or demise as an international actor. 
Development is not that different from foreign policy. Development in a small state 
context is usually understood in terms of economic growth underpinning the rise of a middle 
class and the ending of mass poverty, just as it is with the majority of the Global South. For a 
small state, development qua economics, must always be aligned, or ordered if one prefers, to 
compensate for the small state’s shortfalls in land, labour, capital and technology. This is why 
Malta and Singapore must always stay open and engaged with the global economy. This is also 
the theoretical point this author has made elsewhere about the strategic purpose of virtual 
enlargement (Chong, 2010). 
 Scrutinizing Malta and Singapore in particular, the difference across the three areas of 
examination – foreign policy mitigating the security environment, integration with the global 
economy, and the global branding strategies of each – is revealed as degrees of risk taking. In 
terms of foreign policy, both states have played with multilateralism to guarantee security 
against harassment by bigger states and taken counterintuitive policy measures to displace and 
pre-empt predatory behaviour (Pace, 1999, pp. 203-209; Ganesan, 1998; Pace, 2018 ). One 
party-ruled Singapore has perhaps taken more risks than Malta by consistently cultivating 
relatively substantive ties with communist states and international pariahs during and well after 
the Cold War. Independent Malta however started out cautiously under the extended Anglo-
Maltese climate of transitional economic goodwill carefully coordinated by the centrist 
government of Prime Minister George Borg Oliver of the Nationalist Party. This translated into 
a pro-British and mostly pro-NATO foreign policy. (Pirotta, 2018, pp. 1105-1120) However, 
by 1971 Malta switched to a distinctly non-aligned posture under a left leaning government 
headed by Prime Minister Dom Mintoff of the Malta Labour Party. This stance was upheld 
well into the mid-1980s. By the early 1990s, the attractions of membership in the EU for most 
parties across the political spectrum revived serious talk of tweaking Malta’s constitutionally 
enshrined neutrality to enable it to play a stronger role in EU policymaking (Pace, 2013, pp. 
248-250; Pace, 2018 ).  
Singapore’s boldness in carving out its own version of foreign policy independence 
went from strength to strength. Following Rajaratnam’s dictum of courting all non-hostile, like-
minded states, Singapore has gone out of its way to jointly coordinate a semi-formal Forum of 
Small States (FOSS) at the UN as a significant lobby group and caucus within the organisation. 
FOSS ensures that diplomatic solidarity obtains among small states whenever each member is 
putting up candidates for any official UN appointment. Malta is working with Singapore within 
FOSS; but Singapore has acted in a more gregarious manner by even joining other small state 
caucuses like the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS). A significant reason for Singapore joining the latter two caucuses is to jointly 
lobby for international regimes that will protect low-lying coastal states from the impending 
effects of global warming and the concomitant rise in sea levels worldwide. (UNESCO, n.d.; 
Lee, 2019). Malta has taken no such formal role. 
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On the economic integration front, Singapore and Malta pursued parallel strategies on 
trade and investment enmeshment with the regional economies and the rest of the world. Both 
have been enriched by industries that do not rely heavily on land and labour. They have 
compensated their limitations by borrowing and attracting funds and technology from other 
economies and non-state economic actors. Singapore experimented with economics contra-
ideology, and this paid off in Singapore’s large trade turnover and sizable GDP figures. The 
large body of primary literature on Singapore’s economic thought has revealed a great deal of 
trial and error efforts mixed in with strategic learning and aggressive self-promotion.  
Finally, in terms of national economic branding for the global market, Singapore seems 
to have adopted an extremely high-risk strategy that can trigger significant setbacks since it is 
actively tracking high-tech futuristic industries. Failure remains a distinct possibility depending 
on whether these trend-following strategies can be sustainable despite physical shortcomings 
in land and tangible resources. Malta is embracing high technology and financial businesses in 
a more passive mode, given the persistence of traditional industries like tourism and agro-
fisheries in its GDP composition. Therefore, in going forward in the study of small states’ 
strategies for thriving, one must increasingly devote careful attention to the scrutiny of policy 
innovations in intangible strengths and resources.   
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